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Review Article 
The History of Chinese Intelligence 
R. Gerald Hughes and Kai Chen 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
I.C. Smith and Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence (Lanham, 
MD/Toronto/Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press, 2012), pp. 392, hbk, 
US$110/£80. ISBN: 978-0810871748.  
 
‘[T]he reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy 
whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is 
foreknowledge.’ Sun Tzu1 
 
The activities of Chinese intelligence agencies, like so many facets of that country, 
has long intrigued scholars and commentators in the West. In 2014 Peter Mattis, a 
then fellow of the Jamestown Foundation, noted the enduring ‘mystique [that] 
surrounds Chinese intelligence.’ It’s not just that China is a rival and the global rising 
power. China has not been ‘opened up’ by the revelations that the Russians have 
endured through defectors (such as from Oleg Gordievsky, Vasili Mitrokhin, Sergei 
Tretyakov and others). Such sources account for our knowledge of Soviet era 
intelligence. Thus, with regard to the People’s Republic, the continuing ‘shroud of 
mystery has meant Western observers treat Chinese intelligence as a kind of 
inscrutable beast, operating in fundamentally different ways than their Western and 
Russian counterparts.’2 New analyses are useful and, in this vein, the publication of 
this encyclopedic-type volume on the history of Chinese intelligence should be most 
welcome. It is certainly true that the Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence, 
written by I.C. Smith (former FBI investigator working in Chinese 
counter-intelligence) and Nigel West (prolific author and the editor of the 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence), digs deep into the 
dynamics of Chinese intelligence and counter-intelligence. And Chinese intelligence, 
like the Chinese state itself, has a long history (which can be tracked back all the way 
to the timeless The Art of War by Sun Tzu).  
 
In his review in the CIA in-house journal, Studies in Intelligence, Peter Mattis notes 
that Smith and West mistakenly assert that ‘In the Chinese language, there is no real 
distinction between ‘intelligence’ and ‘information’ in common usage.’ (p. 220). In 
fact, ‘intelligence’ as rendered in Chinese implies information that is actionable. As 
early as 1915, the standard scholarly dictionary (Cihai) defined ‘intelligence’ as being 
‘wartime reports on the adversary’s condition’. The wrongheaded rendering of 
                                                 
1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 144. 
2 Peter Mattis, ‘Five Ways China Spies’, The National Interest, 6 March 2014.  
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‘intelligence’ as ‘information’ then leads the authors to construct the case that Chinese 
intelligence processes and institutions are fundamentally distinct from the Western 
and Russian models (pp. 3-11).3 Amongst scholars, ‘mirror-imaging’ has long been a 
popular criticism of policymakers and intelligence agencies but the assumptions made 
by Smith and West originate from a similar thought process.  
 
Although many in the West expend a good deal of effort seeking to understand 
Chinese intelligence, basic erroneous assumptions distort conclusions. The 
near-obsessive focus with intuitions, has all too often led to a belief that ‘Chinese 
intelligence agencies’ produce ‘Chinese intelligence’. It is assumed that the People’s 
Republic of China operates a strongly centralised and monolithic model when it 
comes to gathering intelligence. This arises out of an assumption that the PRC is 
possessed of a structure akin to that prevailing in the Soviet Union during the Cold 
War (or similar). In a recent review, Sergey Radchenko criticised a particular book on 
Chinese intelligence for its lack of context – especially the political context within 
which ‘intelligence’ operates. (And in pursuing this end, the close study of Chinese 
‘strategic culture’4 would yield commensurate benefits).5 The book under review, 
Radchenko contends, thus concentrates on bodies like the Ministry of Public Security 
and the nature of the information that it actually collects, whilst engaging in an 
all-too-brief discussion of how Chairman Mao Zedong ‘perceived the role of 
intelligence’.6 Taking us back to the basics of intelligence gathering, Peter Mattis 
reminds us of five ways in which the PRC gathers intelligence outside of the familiar 
intelligence structures of the modern national security state.7      
 
 Diplomats, defence attachés and journalists 
 Seeding Operations (i.e. penetrating the adversary’s structures) 
 Academics and scholars 
 The cover afforded by local government offices in the PRC 
 Businesspersons in the PRC itself and overseas 
 
In part, at least, such misperceptions of China (and, indeed, of many states’ manner of 
utilising intelligence) are derived from the fact that it is all too often forgotten that 
intelligence is partly comprised of information. Intelligence is not (or at least not 
always) information derived from the clandestine activities of intelligence agencies. 
This is a crucial point. The notion that all intelligence is clandestine and all 
intelligence is gathered by dedicated collection bodies is all too prevalent amongst 
even those who really should know better. (And, of course, intelligence agencies and 
                                                 
3 Peter Mattis, review of I.C. Smith and Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence in 
Studies in Intelligence, 56/4 (2012), p. 23.  
4 On this specifically, see Warren I. Cohen, ‘China’s Strategic Culture’, Atlantic Monthly, 279/3 
(1997), pp. 103-5. 
5  See, for example, Xuezhi Guo, China's Security State: Philosophy, Evolution and Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
6 Sergey Radchenko, review of Michael Schoenhals, Spying for the people: Mao’s secret agents, 
1949–1967, Intelligence and National Security, 31/6 (2016), p. 929. 
7 Mattis, ‘Five Ways China Spies’. 
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their employees are all too keen to perpetuate the myth of the omnipotence of 
intelligence agencies). It is important to remember that the effective use of 
intelligence for many states predated the establishment of the formal administrative 
bodies with a remit to ‘do’ intelligence. The British, for example, had a reputation for 
effective collection and use of intelligence long before the establishment of the Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS) in 1909. Clumsy assumptions continue to cause problems 
for those seeking to further our understanding of Chinese intelligence.  
 
One of the reasons Chinese intelligence operations do not seem to 
make sense to observers is that they mistake intelligence for the 
theft of secrets. Intelligence does not mean the acquisition of 
“classified” or “secret” information. Intelligence is the acquisition 
and processing of information that assists in formulating policy and 
guiding action. Classification has nothing to do with it; Beijing’s 
concerns do. China concerns in the United States go beyond U.S. 
policy, including overseas Chinese populations, democracy 
activists, counterintelligence, and scientific expertise. And … the 
Chinese seem to be very comfortable with merely secondhand 
access to sensitive information.8 
 
The wrongheaded nature of certain of the external views of the intelligence cycle in 
China notwithstanding this volume is still of value (not least die tot the fact that such 
misperceptions are applied to a great many states). This dictionary is thus to be 
welcomed for the manner in which it meticulously explores and analyses numerous 
cases regarding Chinese intelligence and counter-intelligence over an extended 
historical span. Many of the cases and concepts under discussion in this volume 
demonstrate nothing so much as the fact that, in the main, the Chinese experience of 
intelligence is different from those of their Western counterparts. The authors deploy 
comprehensive cross-references, making this volume more readable and more useful 
to readers with an interest in the burgeoning field of Chinese Intelligence Studies.9 
The volume is sub-divided into three sections. First, we are presented with a 
chronology of Chinese intelligence. Second, the authors seek to outline the evolution 
and development of Chinese intelligence operations. And, third, the dictionary itself. 
This is by far the longest portion of the book and contains a myriad of entries (many 
of which have, alas, only a tangential relationship with Chinese intelligence per se – 
e.g. Uzbekistan (p. 278)).  
 
To a Chinese reviewer in particular, this dictionary makes two central contributions to 
the literature on Chinese intelligence and counter-intelligence. First, although many 
cases of US intelligence and counter-intelligence activities against the People’s 
                                                 
8 Mattis, ‘Five Ways China Spies’. 
9 On this, see the recent piece in the CIA in-house journal, namely: David Ian Chambers, ‘Edging in 
from the Cold: The Past and Present State of Chinese Intelligence Historiography’, Studies in 
Intelligence, 56/3 (2012), pp. 31-46. 
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Republic of China are well documented, many of these cases are still not familiar to 
Chinese readers. To take one example, the authors record the fact that, in 1981, a 
former US marine, one Lawrence Gardella, published a sensational memoir entitled 
Sing a Song to Jenny Next. This book ‘revealed’ a top-secret US mission into the 
People’s Republic of China and, as an adventure yarn, it rivalled the likes of Fitzroy 
Maclean. The mission took place in May 1952, even as the West and China were 
fighting each other at the height of the Korean War.10 In Gardella’s account, the 
mission entailed he and a small number of colleagues being assigned to attack a 
nuclear facility underneath the Sungari Reservoir near the border with North Korea (p. 
99). This mission involved a team of six marines, who had purportedly received 
special training from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), prior to being parachuted 
into China, linking up with Nationalist Chinese sympathizers and destroying the atomic 
laboratory. Gardella related that his team had fought a series of battles against 
Communist troops during a 1,000-mile, three-week journey across northern China 
before being picked up in a pre-arranged rendezvous with a US submarine in the 
Yellow Sea. The escape saga reads like something penned by Joseph Conrad and 
features gun battles with the Soviets, US prisoners of war glimpsed in cages, and an 
escape arranged by a female fighter dubbed ‘The Dragon Lady’, after the character in 
the popular comic strip ‘Terry and the Pirates’. The book was denounced as a work of 
fiction by the United States Marine Corps (USMC), with one unnamed officer opining 
that ‘It is a great story that does the Corps credit, but as far as we can tell, it never 
happened’.11 Such sober views were largely buried, however, as the struggle between 
truth and legend, once again, proved to be an unequal contest. The controversy 
remains undiminished and, as recently as 2010, one author evaluated the veracity of 
Gardella’s volume in the following terms: ‘Only time will tell whether this account 
tells of one of the [Korean] war’s most bizarre covert operations or [is] a hoax.’12 
 
Second, this dictionary exposes the Taiwanese intelligence agents’ activities in the 
United States. These are seldom mentioned in other general works on Chinese 
intelligence. For instance, in 2004 Donald W. Keyser (the former principal deputy 
assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs), recruited by Taiwan's 
National Intelligence Bureau, transported numerous classified documents from the 
State Department to his home.13 The documents, discovered during a search of 
Keyser's home on 4 September 2004, comprised some 3,559 classified pieces 
(including 28 deemed ‘Top Secret’) in hard-copy format. 14  These included 
ultra-sensitive documents from the Department of State, the National Security 
                                                 
10 Lawrence Gardella, Sing a Song to Jenny Next (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1981). Gardella himself 
died of leukemia a few months before the publication of his book.  
11 Edwin McDowell, ‘Book on Chinese Atomic Lab denied by Marine Corps’, New York Times, 25 
October 1981.  
12 Keith D. McFarland, The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Routledge, rev. 2nd 
edition, 2010), p. 179. 
13 J. Cole, ‘Ex-US official admits taking secret papers amid Taiwanese liaison’, Agence France-Presse, 
13 December 2005. 
14  Stéphane Lefebvre, ‘The Case of Donald Keyser and Taiwan’s National Security Bureau’, 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 20/3 (2007), p. 515. 
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Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency (Keyser’s wife, a CIA staffer, was also 
discovered to have removed classified documents from the agency (p. 36)). In 
December 2005 Keyser pled guilty to three charges, admitting that he had removed 
classified documents and digital memory devices from the Department of State to his 
residence. He also admitted to lying the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the 
Department of State about his relationship with Taiwanese intelligence. Keyser also 
admitted that he lied on a U.S. Customs Declaration by not listing Taiwan as a 
country that he had visited. In January 2007, Keyser was sentenced today to 12 
months and one day in prison, fined $25,000 fine. The United States Attorney for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, Chuck Rosenberg, drew a line under the affair stating that 
Keyser ‘had an absolute obligation to safeguard the classified information entrusted to 
him and utterly failed to do so. His sentence of imprisonment is a warning to others in 
positions of public trust.’15 
 
One of the most intriguing entries in the dictionary concerns one Joan Hinton. Hinton, 
recruited to work on the wartime Manhattan Project in February 1944, collaborated 
with Enrico Fermi as a member of a team which ‘built two reactors for testing 
enriched uranium and plutonium’.16 At the ultra-secretive facility at Los Alamos, 
Hinton made a not inconsiderable contribution to the development of the uranium 
weapon (‘FAT MAN’) dropped on Nagasaki on 9 August (p. 111). Following the 
nuclear attacks on Japan, and as the Cold War intensified, a disillusioned Joan Hinton 
became an outspoken peace activist. In 1948, she fled to China, and then was labeled 
a traitor for having disclosed nuclear secrets. The furore in the US over over ‘Who 
lost China?’17  (‘communists and queers’ in the State Department according to 
Senator Joe McCarthy)18 perhaps made such charges inevitable at some stage. They 
were rendered even more likely as China was, at that time, fighting a war against UN 
forces in Korea. During the McCarthy era, Hinton was accused of being an atomic spy 
after she addressed a peace conference in Beijing. Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias 
(USN)19 denounced Hinton in a 1953 article for Real magazine entitled ‘The Atom 
Spy Who Got Away.’ Despite such charges, there is no evidence that she ever 
betrayed any secrets to anyone (and, in any case, the Chinese did not attain nuclear 
status until 1964) or even worked as a physicist after 1948. Hinton nevertheless 
remained a loyal disciple of Mao Zedong to the end. In 2008, during a visit to Japan, 
Hinton stated that ‘[i]t would have been terrific if Mao had lived’. And, perhaps more 
                                                 
15 Lefebvre, ‘The Case of Donald Keyser and Taiwan’s National Security Bureau’, p. 522. 
16 V.J. Nelson, ‘Joan Hinton - Oct. 20, 1921-June 8, 2010 – Joined Maoist Revolution after helping 
develop the atomic bomb’, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (PA), 24 June 2010.  
17 Stephen Glain. State vs. Defense: The Battle to Define America's Empire (New York: Crown, 2011), 
p. 68. 
18 For polemics, see John T. Flynn, While You Slept: Our Tragedy in Asia and Who Made It (New York: 
Devin-Adair, 1951); Anthony Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of 
Communist China, 1941-1949 (Chicago, IL: Regnery, 1963). 
19 An intelligence specialist, Zacharias (1890-1961) served in both world wars and, in the 1920s, 
served in Tokyo as naval attaché to the Japanese Empire. After the Second World War, he was the 
deputy director of US Naval Intelligence. After retiring he presented an NBC television series (Behind 
Closed Doors) which covered shadowy Cold War incidents (of which he had been involved with as a 
serving USN officer). The series ran for twenty-six episodes between October 1958 and April 1959. 
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surprisingly for a ‘peace activist’, she declared herself ‘100 percent behind everything 
that happened in the Cultural Revolution - it was a terrific experience.’20 Given her 
life and works it is small wonder the Western intelligence community remained 
fascinated with Hinton’s extraordinary case until long after the Cold War had ended 
(she died only in 2010). 
 
Having read the Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence, the authors clearly 
believed (in 2012, when the volume was published) that the US Intelligence 
Community (IC) regarded the People’s Republic of China as the main global threat in 
the spheres of cyber-spying and cyber-espionage. Of course, recent events – not least 
the US presidential election of 2016 – now place Russia in that role in the opinion of 
most informed observers. Indeed, in early 2015, the Director of National Intelligence, 
James Clapper, told the Senate Armed Services Committee: ‘While I can’t go into 
detail here, the Russian cyber threat is more severe than we had previously assessed’. 
Clapper made this statement when presenting a report entitled Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. This document, noting increasing 
Russian sophistication in this area, argued that: 
 
Cyber threats to U.S. national and economic security are increasing 
in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of impact … [And] 
Russia certainly has been more active than any other country in 
terms of combining cyber-attacks, or cyber-operations, with 
physical operations.  The Russia-Georgia war of 2008 was a perfect 
example of a combined kinetic and cyber operation.  And nobody 
else has ever done that – China has never done anything like that.21 
 
That said, many illustrative cases of ‘cyber-friction’ between the PRC and the USA 
are included in this dictionary. These include the precautions (codenamed 
AVOCADO) undertaken to protect U.S. computer systems from cyber-attack (p. 23). 
This fits with pessimistic and unchanging forecasts, usually informed by the political 
ideology of Realism, made by US commentators since the end of the Cold War. As 
long ago as 1997 Warren I. Cohen wrote that: 
 
[G]enerational change will not guarantee a kinder, gentler China. 
Nor will the ultimate disappearance of communism in Beijing. The 
powerful China we have every reason to expect in the twenty-first 
century is likely to be as aggressive and expansionist as China has 
been whenever it has been the dominant power in Asia - except 
                                                 
20 William Grimes, ‘Joan Hinton, Physicist Who Chose China Over Atom Bomb, Is Dead at 88’, New 
York Times, June11, 2010. 
21 DNI James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 26 February 2015. 
URL:https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Clapper_02-26-15.pdf (accessed 5 July 
2017). 
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when its leaders have reason to believe that potential adversaries 
have both the power and the determination to stop them.22 
 
It is undoubtedly the case that the PRC has sought (and seeks) to gain access to 
governmental, defence, financial, and technological networks within the USA. As 
with all modern cyber security issues, all sides are vulnerable to the smallest 
weaknesses in existing software. This often involves the insertion of harmful 
programs smuggled onto networks via the deceptively benign medium of e-mail. In 
2010 the Washington Post reported that ‘congressional and industry sources’ had 
identified over 30 US companies (including Google, Yahoo, Symantec, Adobe, 
Northrop Grumman and Dow Chemical) that had been the subject of cyber-attacks 
emanating from China. James A. Lewis, a cyber security expert at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, stated that: ‘This is a big espionage program 
aimed at getting high-tech information and politically sensitive information - the 
high-tech information to jump-start China’s economy and the political information to 
ensure the survival of the regime’. For Lewis, this was ‘what China's leadership is 
after. This reflects China's national priorities.’23  
 
As is so often the case with powerful states, accusations of subterfuge against rising 
adversaries are accompanied by a real fear of the achievement of legitimate equality. 
In the case of the United States and the People’s Republic we saw a perfect instance 
of the fear of competition – by both ‘foul’ and ‘fair’ means – in May 2017. This 
occurred when the New York Times reported both significant Chinese 
counterintelligence successes against the US24 (which saw the killing of several CIA 
human ‘assets’),25 and discussed fears that the People’s Republic was close to 
overhauling the American Republic in the crucial field of Artificial Intelligence 
(AI).26    
 
Governments obviously neglect security measures in matters of cyber capabilities at 
their peril, as they were reminded when networks across the globe were attacked in 
May 2017. The so-called WannaCry ransomware attack targeted computers running the 
Microsoft Windows operating, demanding ransom payments in the Bitcoin 
‘cryptocurrency’. The attack affected an astonishing 230,000 computers in over 150 
countries (and victims included the UK National Health Service (NHS), Spain's 
Telefónica, Renault of France and the German state-owned giant, Deutsche Bahn.27  
                                                 
22 Cohen, ‘China’s Strategic Culture’, p. 105. 
23 Ariana Eunjung Cha and Ellen Nakashima, ‘Google China cyberattack part of vast espionage 
campaign, experts say’, The Washington Post, 14 January 2010. 
24 Mark Mazzetti, Adam Goldman, Michael S. Schmidt and Matt Apuzzo, ‘Killing C.I.A. Informants, 
China Crippled U.S. Spying Operations’, New York Times, 20 May 2017. 
25 Eye World: ‘Letter from Beijing from Our own correspondent’, Private Eye, 1445, 2-15 June 2017.  
26 Paul Mozur and John Markoff, ‘Is China Outsmarting America in A.I.?’, New York Times, 27 May 
2017.  
27 BBC News, ‘Cyber-attack: Europol says it was unprecedented in scale’, 13 May 2017. URL: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-39907965 (accessed 6 July 2017). Soon after the attack it 
was widely reported that the ‘hacking tool’ used against the UK National Health Service (NHS) had 
been developed by, and stolen from, the ultra-secretive US National Security Agency (NSA). On this, 
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Smith and West are virtually silent regarding the most critical challenge facing 
Sino-American relations in the cyber realm: namely, the phenomenon of so-called 
‘onion routing’.28 Onion routing, developed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in 
the 1990s,29  was primarily designed to enable U.S. intelligence agents to collect 
information without exposing their identities or locations. Onion routing is therefore 
used for anonymous communication, making it much more difficult for the states to 
monitor intelligence activities. What does the onion routing mean to Chinese 
intelligence in the foreseeable future? Alas, the dictionary has little to say on the matter. 
Omissions on onion routing notwithstanding, the Historical Dictionary of Chinese 
Intelligence represents a decent survey of the dynamics of Chinese intelligence and 
counter-intelligence, past and present. This dictionary should be required reading for all 
those who are interested in such matters, as well as anyone who wishes to engage in 
scholarly debates on the evolution of. Comprising a veritable cornucopia of 
information, the Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence deserves a place in the 
Intelligence Studies literature and would a useful addition to the library of anyone 
interested in Sino-American relations, Chinese politics and the history of Chinese 
foreign policy.  
R. Gerald Hughes 
Aberystwyth University 
Email: rbh@aber.ac.uk 
 
Kai Chen  
Xiamen University  
Email: kaichen@xmu.edu.cn  
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